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Abstract 
This article explores the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and policy in Australia. In particular it explores how 
legislation facilitated prosecution and conviction of persons involved in home-grown terrorism, including analysis of 
investigation and prosecution policy surrounding the ul-Haque and Haneef cases. Particular attention is given to the 
terrorism trials involving Benbrika & Ors and Elomar & Ors. What makes these trials intriguing is the fact that most 
of those convicted could be more easily described as more vulnerable than menacing.   Sentencing of those convicted 
was cognate with no policies for rehabilitation. The small number of convictions under the legislation when 
considered against the increased funding of counter-terrorism, loss of traditional rights and privileges and 
Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq raises issues about adequate policy setting in this area. 
 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the Australian Government moved swiftly to legislate to counter 
potential terrorist acts within Australia. To date there have been more than 40 pieces of legislation that relate directly 
or indirectly to terrorism. The aim and purpose of terrorism legislation are twofold: to act as a deterrent and to 
prevent future terrorist acts.  This legislation formed an important component of counter-terrorism policy because it 
not only focused on preventing a terrorist act taking place, but convicted terrorists were to be severely punished. The 
disjunction between the traditional criminal law principles of attempt offences and modern counter-terrorism 
legislation becomes obvious in the Benbrika and Elomar trials where no terrorist act occurred. This lack of a 
completed terrorist act is a consistent fact in the conduct of all 21 persons convicted in Australia since 2001. 
Furthermore, a consideration of the background and relationships of the respective accused in these two criminal 
trials provide insights into radicalism and motive. What is important for those involved in combating potential 
terrorists within Australia is the nature of the evidence that underpinned these two convictions and the lack of policy 
on combating radicalisation of vulnerable persons. This is particularly important as there is a growing concern 
supported by research that demonstrates an increase in home-grown terrorism (Porter & Kebbell, 2010).  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The counter-terrorism legislation should not be viewed in isolation. It represents a component of counter-terrorism 
policy that includes international obligationsi, international treatiesii, internationaliii and domestic co-operationiv, wide 
reaching legislationv, policy revisionvi and significant domestic expenditure. The Australian Government has 
increased defence spending some 59% since 2001 to $21.8 billion (Michaelson, 2010, 24). Michaelsen further notes: 
 
More than $16 billion have been spent in extra defence, counter-terrorism and foreign aid by 2010-11. Over 
the same period, ASIO’s budget has increased by 655%, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) budget by 
161percent, ASIS by 236 percent and the Office of National Assessments by 441 percent. Most recently, the 
Government has announced a $200 billion package of aviation security measures to better protect our air 
transport system from terrorist attack, And the White Paper provides $69 million for introducing biometric-
based visa systems to reduce the risk of terrorists, criminals and other persons of concern entering Australia 
undetected. (Michaelson, 2010, 24) 
.  
The policy support for counter-terrorism legislation and expenditure has been aided by the killing of 100 Australians 
in overseas terrorist attacks and Australian soldiers have been killed and injured fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
These events maintain the on-going perceived risk of terrorism to Australians abroad and by implication at home.     
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LEGISLATION 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia has created a single set of terrorism offences under the Section 100 of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code). The objective was to create offences: 
 
Designed to prevent, discourage and punish behaviour which falls within a wide range of human activity, 
and which is commonly described as terrorism: broadly, the use of violence or a threat of violence in pursuit 
of some political, ideological or religious cause. (Criminal Code, s.100) 
 
Furthermore, anti-terrorism legislation defines a terrorist act widely, encompassing industrial and political dissent.vii 
In 2005 these powers were extended to include organisations that advocate the doing of a terrorist act.viii  The key 
provision in the Criminal Code is: 
  
    Division 101 -- Terrorism  
101.1   Terrorist acts  
             (1)  A person commits an offence if the person engages in a terrorist act.  
             Penalty:  Imprisonment for life... 
              
101.2   Providing or receiving training connected with terrorist acts  
             (1)... 
  (2)... 
             (3)  A person commits an offence under this section even if:  
                     (a)  a terrorist act does not occur; or  
                     (b)  the training is not connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, or 
assistance in a specific terrorist act; or  
                     (c)  the training is connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, or assistance 
in more than one terrorist act...ix  
 
The policy imperatives were allowing an early opportunity at which the facts can be submitted establishing a prima 
facie case and providing cogent punishment of persons convicted of terrorism offences. For the former point this 
represents a winding back of the traditional law on attempt offences. Traditionally, the common law viewed attempt 
offences as unfinished offences and distinguished between acts that were preparatory and acts that were sufficient to 
amount to attempt (Bronitt & McSherry, 2005).  In other words, for an accused to commit an offence it had to be 
proved that an accused intended to commit a crime by engaging in conduct that is more than preparatory such that 
the acts must be proximate (not remote) from the completed act (Bronitt & McSherry, 2005). This amounts to an 
extension of criminal liability from what an accused did to what an accused tried to do; or under Division 101 of the 
Criminal Code above what an accused may have contemplated. The result is that the authorities can arrest well 
before completion of the anticipated crime. Historically, this has led to appeal cases determining how far police can 
throw their net in attempting to prevent crime.x However, this does appear to be the case with terrorism appeals in 
Australia. The policy underpinning this legislation is to allow authorities to act well before any damage is done or 
even a target is chosen so as to limit potential death or injury to civilians.  
 
In addition, the Australian Government can now classify an organisation as a terrorist organisation. This means that 
its members may have, by being members of a proscribed organisation, committed an offence (Criminal Code, s. 102 
1).  Furthermore, federal legislation has tossed aside traditional common law rights such as a right to silence, 
unrestricted access to a lawyer of choice and freedom of speech (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 
1979 (Cth) ss.34G, 34TA and 34NVAA).  
 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION  
 
Whereas the investigation and prosecution of those involved in terrorism offences as in the Benbrika and Elomar 
trials were largely uneventful that has not always been the case with terrorism investigations and prosecutions since 
2001. Two examples stand out. The first is the failed prosecution of Izhar ul-Haque which raised serious concerns 
about the conduct of Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers and Australian Security Intelligence Officers (ASIO) 
cumulating in The Street Review – A Review of Interoperability between the AFP and its National Security Partners 
(Street Report). The report noted that the prosecution failed,  
 
…when evidence essential to the Crown’s case was ruled inadmissible in pre-trial hearings. NSW Supreme 
Court Justice Michael Adams was highly critical of the manner in which the AFP and ASIO had dealt with the 
suspect, and it was on these grounds that he determined critical evidence inadmissible. (Street Report, 1.5 [1]) 
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Justice Adams in Izar ul-Haque noted, amongst other criticisms: 
The precise boundaries of the term “oppressive...conduct” are uncertain. Some assistance is afforded by the 
other conduct mentioned in para 84(1)(a). For the purposes of this case, however, it is not necessary to 
approach the boundaries of the term. In my view, the conduct of ASIO, in particular by officers B15 and 
B16, was well within the meaning of the phrase. In substance, they assumed unlawful powers of direction, 
control and detention. It was a gross interference by the agents of the state with the accused’s legal rights as 
a citizen, rights which he still has whether he be suspected of criminal conduct or not and whether he is a 
Muslim or not. Furthermore, the conduct was deliberately engaged in for the purpose of overbearing the 
accused in the hope that he would co-operate. It involved using a part of his parents’ home to hold him 
incommunicado for the purposes of an interview under cover of a warrant which the officers knew well did 
not justify any such conduct but which I think they rightly believed neither the accused nor his family 
understood. Whatever “oppressive” means for the purposes of s84, I do not doubt that the conduct of the 
ASIO officers falls well within it (R v Izar ul-Haque, [95]).  
And later:   
 
The evidence of the ASIO conduct, considered alone, would be sufficient to establish oppressive conduct 
within the section. But the oppression was continued, in my view, by the conduct of the AFP. Mr Gordge’s 
presence at the interviews was a clear signal to the accused of the inextricable link between ASIO and the 
AFP and an implicit reminder that he should not depart from anything already said. The conversations with 
him at the end of the interview on 7 November and when he came to AFP headquarters on 10 November 
continued the thrust of the message communicated by ASIO at the first meeting: co-operate or else. (R v Izar 
ul-Haque , [98]) 
 
It needs to be remembered that those investigating potential terrorism offences have wider powers than in 
investigating other criminal offences. To start with the terrorism provisions are drafted widely picking up persons 
who not only commit a terrorist act but do anything that can be linked to a potential terrorist act. The latter gives a 
wide subjective discretion to authorities. Combined with this discretion are powers requiring compliancexi, 
production of documents and informationxii and silencing of persons questioned about terrorism matters or being 
investigated about terrorism mattersxiii.  On two occasions the checks and balances that are supposed to protect 
citizens from unwarranted prosecution have failed. Damian Bugg AM QC, former Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (CDPP) in a press release dated 12 October 2007 noted in regard to the failure of the CDPP to follow 
policy in the Dr Haneef prosecution: 
 
The Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth provides that there be a prima facie case with reasonable 
prospects of conviction for a prosecution to be instituted or continued. The DPP’S role is to provide advice on 
whether the evidence establishes reasonable prospects of conviction in accordance with that policy. 
 
The advice given in this case did not address that test.xiv 
 
His successor Christopher Craigie SC has nonetheless in a Directors speech on 12 November 2009 at the Heads of 
Prosecutions Agencies of the Commonwealth (HOPAC) conference affirmed CDPP compliance with government 
policy directions: 
 
…the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth commences by recognising that not all suspected criminal 
offences must automatically be subject of prosecution…The initial consideration in the exercise of this 
discretion is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the institution or continuation of a prosecution…a 
decision whether or not to prosecute must clearly not be influenced by: 
a. The race, religion, sex, national origin or political associations, activities or beliefs of the alleged offender 
or any other person involved… 
b. … 
c. Possible political advantage or disadvantage to the Government or any political group or party or…xv. 
 
While not seemingly involved in the initial issues surrounding the questioning and detention of Izhar ul-Haque, it 
would be fascinating to hear what the CDPP’s advice was upon receiving the AFP brief especially as there were 
several attempts to bring the matter before the High Court of Australia on an extraterritoriality issue. In essence, 
challenging the constitutional validity of proscribing the conduct of Australian citizens overseas for conduct 
unconnected with Australia (Nolan, 2008, 175-90). The Street Review recommended greater co-operation between 
CDPP, ASIO and AFP. However, Nolan doubts whether greater interoperability and information sharing will 
“remedy the problematic investigative methods as exposed by Justice Adams” (Nolan, 2008, 183). Furthermore and 
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also noted in Nolan’s article, the Street Report noted at 6: 
 
1.6 The outcome of the ul-Haque matter has demonstrated that the preconditions to criminal prosecution need 
to be taken into consideration by all of Australia’s national security agencies in the conduct of their operations 
if the full range of preventative measures, including prosecution, is to remain available to combat terrorism. 
 
Of some concern for policy makers is the not unsurprising difference of opinion on some issues involving the 
behaviour of ASIO agents towards ul-Haque between Justice Adams in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and 
Ian Carnell, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in regard to trespass, coercive interviewing, kidnapping 
and false imprisonment of ul-Haque (Nolan, 2008, 187). While Justice Adams was concerned with legal rights and 
the law, Ian Carnell claimed national security imperatives in the war on terror (Nolan, 2008, 187).xvi  
 
Furthermore, there is a structural problem arising from different statutory authorities combating terrorism. This was 
identified in the Street Report at 6: 
 
1.8 The Committee recognises that ASIO and the AFP have different statutory mandates. Both agencies, 
and State and Territory police jurisdictions, have a clear mandate to prevent terrorist activity. In responding 
to potential national security threats the ASIO mandate is broadly focused, whereas the AFP and its state 
and territory counterparts are generally focused on the demands of criminal investigations and potential 
prosecutions. It is critical that effective and accountable processes exist to reconcile any overlaps or 
conflicts in organisational mandates and priorities. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Another way to review the success or otherwise of counter-terrorism policy and legislation is to consider who has 
been convicted. In Victoria in 2009 and NSW in 2010 two large criminal trials concluded with those convicted 
receiving lengthy sentences of imprisonment. Overall, some 22 men were accused of various terrorism related 
offences.  
 
In the Victorian matter - Benbrika & Ors 13 men were accused of offences against Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code in December 2006. One, Izzydeen Atik pleaded guilty in July 2007 and the other 12 went to trial 
commencing in February 2008. On 15 and 16 September 2008 seven were convicted of knowingly being members of 
a terrorist organisation and some of other offences. Four were acquitted and in one case the jury could not reach a 
verdict. 
 
The prosecution needed to convince a jury that each of the accused was a member of a terrorist organisation together 
were planning to commit a terrorist act. The evidence consisted of: 
 
 Attendance at religious classes, 
 Talk of being involved in violent jihad, 
 The existence of a jemaah to hold money for the group members, 
 482 intercepted telephone conversations, 
 Inconclusive evidence of trips away to training camps, 
 Stealing a car to fund the groups activities, 
 Internet access to websites - beheading of hostages – jihadi literature – terrorist handbooks…including for 
example in Haddara’s computer two copies of a publication called ‘AL-Battar Bimonthly Publication No 22’ 
– a military or quasi-military training guide or manual – found in two files, a Word document file and a PDF 
file called ‘22.doc’ and ‘22.pdf’ respectively – in zip archive file, ‘10.11.04 b22.zip’ – in‘Other/’ – at end of 
a chain of limbs directed to Haddara’s business.xvii  
 
The final evidence related to Benbrika’s activities with an undercover policeman who demonstrated the use of 
explosives. There was no evidence that other members of Benbrika’s group knew or were involved in these activities. 
It should also be noted that internet access by one member of the group may have little or no significance on the 
criminality of other members. However, if there is regular contact between group members who among other things 
share internet derived materials these materials assume greater significance if they relate to terrorism. Courts are also 
careful to distinguish ‘benign’ material, for example; Arab language classes and American movies from images 
extolling the virtues of 11 September 2001, images of Osama bin Laden and/or praising his activities in relation to 
warfare, extremely gruesome images including beheadings and executions of foreign prisoners.(R v Mulahalilovic 
[2009] [16 – 17].  
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Table 1, The Benbrika Men, sets out background data and resultant sentences for those convicted in Benbrika & Ors.  
Of particular interest is the age difference between Benbrika and the followers. The educational background and 
resultant qualifications are mediocre for the followers. Furthermore several of the followers have suffered a family 
crisis in the years leading up to arrest.  
 
 
name  
age at sentence  born  Married/ 
children  
education Prior character Penalty 
Max/sent/non-
parole (yrs/mths)  
Add 1184 days of 
Pre-trial custody 
Benbrika  48 
Religion after 
arriving here – 
religious 
advisor  
1941 -
Algiers  
1989 - 
Australia  
Yes/7  Aviation engineer – 
religious leader here  
good  25/15/12  
Aimen 
Joud  
24  1984  no  Did not finish school – 
supervisor fathers blding 
bus.  
good 
good references  
25/8/7.6  
Fadl 
Sayadi  
28  Lebanon 
1983 - here  
Yes/no  Left yr 10  minor priors 
good references 
25/8/6  
Abdullah 
Merhi  
23  Melbourne   Yes/1  Left yr 11 – completing 
electrical apprentice ship  
good 
good references 
10/6/4.6  
Ahmed 
Raad  
25 
Death of 
brother – 
religion - 
Benbrika  
Australia  Yes/1  Left yr 11 unsuccessful 
TAFE  
good 
good references 
25/8/7.6  
Ezzit 
Raad  
26 
Death of 
brother – 
religion - 
Benbrika  
Australia  Yes/2  electrician  good 
good references 
25/6/5.6  
Amer 
Haddara  
29 
Mecca 2004 – 
tour leader 
2005  
Australia  no  Computer systems Dip – 
VU  
good 
good references 
10/6/4.6  
 
Table 1: The Benbrika Men 
In the Brenrika trial and subsequent sentencing hearing none of the accused gave evidence which meant no 
explanation/justification was given by those convicted of their reasons for being involved with Benbrika. This had a 
direct impact on sentencing wherein the sentencing judge noted that rehabilitation played little or no part.  
 
What is clear is that motive was clearly inferred from the telephone intercepts. Porter and Kebell (2010, 8) noted that, 
‘Benbrika and his group showed later isolation within the Muslim community, breaking away from the local 
mosque’. This isolation was also noted in a lack of attachment to the wider community with Benbrika covertly 
recorded saying: ‘...I don’t believe in this country. I don’t believe in this law. Which all this believe, no Allah but 
Allah, no Allah no other law of. This is the meaning of no Allah but Allah’ (Porter and Kebbell, 2010, 8). In terms of 
group dynamics Benbrika increased the sense of collective identity of the group by use of inclusive first person 
pronouns (Porter and Kebbell, 2010, 9).  
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In the New South Wales matter, Elomar & Ors, nine men were accused of a series of terrorism related offences in 
late 2005. Shortly before the trial three men pleaded guilty and one was at that stage found to be unfit to plead. He 
subsequently recovered sufficiently to plead guilty. The remaining five were found guilty by a jury in October 2009 
of conspiring to do a terrorist act. The difference between this trial and the Benbrika trial is that here the accused 
were charged with conspiracy to commit a terrorist act. A conspiracy offence requires proof of the existence of an 
agreement to do an illegal act, here to commit a terrorist act. Because criminal agreements are rarely written, the 
existence of the agreement is proved by evidence that is termed overt acts.  
In Elomar & Ors the evidence relied upon was: 
 
 Ammunition, 
 Laboratory equipment, 
 Training camps, 
 Purchase of chemicals, 
 Internet derived instructional material and some hard copies about explosives, eavesdropping and 
gun use, 
 Internet derived material of an extremist or fundamentalist matter. With some evidence of hard 
copies being distributed amongst some members of the group,  
 Telephone conversations,  
 Fingerprints, and 
 Meetings. 
 
The evidence in this matter was more substantial and revealing. Although there was no target, the evidence was more 
consistent with what would be expected of a terrorist group planning to carry out a terrorist act. The dynamics of the 
Elomar group are also different. Here the ages are collectively higher with less difference between the leader and the 
followers. The same can be said in regard to qualifications and educational background.  
 
Table 2 below, The Elomar Conspirators, sets out background data on the Elomar group including the sentences 
handed down following conviction.  
name  age at 
sentence  
born  married/children  education  Prior 
character  
Penalty 
max/sent/non-
parole (yrs/mths)  
Mohamed 
Elomar  
44  Lebanon 
1977 - 
Australia  
Yes/6  Trade qual – family 
bus.  
good  Life/28/21  
Khalid 
Cheiko  
36 
Took to 
religion in 
20’s  
Lebanon Yes/1  Left yr 11   Life/27/20  
Abdul 
Hasan  
40 
Culturally 
isolated 
Bangladesh 
1990? - 
Australia  
Yes (convert)/4 Poor work history – 
basic 
English/limited 
Arabic  
good  Life/26/19.6  
Moustata 
Cheikho  
32 
1995 – 
religion - 
Influence of 
Khalid 
Cheiko  
Australia 
Attended LeT 
training camp 
Pakistan  
Yes/1  Did not finish 
mechanics trade – 
gun licence till 
ASIO..  
good  Life/26/19.6  
Mohammed 
Jamal  
26 
Drugs/OH at 
school – 
religion via 
brother  
Australia  No – male family 
cannot visit him  
Yr 10 & computer 
skills  
good  Life/23/17.3  
Table 2: The Elomar Conspirators 
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As in the Benbrika Case, in Elomar & Ors none of the accused gave evidence at trial or during sentencing 
proceedings. Motive was derived primarily from intercepted telephone recordings. In regard to motive Justice 
Whealy noted: 
 
First, each was driven by the concept that the world was, in essence, divided between those who adhered 
strictly and fundamentally to a rigid concept of the Muslim faith, indeed, a medieval view of it, and to those 
who did not, Secondly, each was driven by the conviction that Islam throughout the world was under attack, 
particularly at the hands of the United States and its allies. In this context, Australia was plainly included. 
Thirdly, each offender was convinced that his obligation as a devout Muslim was to come to the defence of 
Islam and other Muslims overseas. Fourthly, it was the duty of each individual offender, indeed a religious 
obligation, to respond to the worldwide situation by preparing for violent jihad in this country, here in 
Australia (R v Elomar & Ors, 2010, [56]) 
 
However, while there was evidence of members in both groups taking on roles both groups were poor role models 
for future groups considering how to successfully commit a terrorist act. While the evidence demonstrates the 
Elomar group were more advanced in preparation, having ammunition and bomb-making materials, their efforts 
were described by counsel representing one terrorist on sentencing as; “…they were amateurish and ineffective. 
Thirdly, it was argued that the offender's (Touma’s) cognitive and other skills were lessened to a degree by the limit 
of his intellectual capacity…”(R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475 (24 October 2008) [105]). The lack of skills 
demonstrated by these individuals was recognised with Justice Bongiorno who also sounded a warning: 
 
Overseas experience of terrorist activity with which we are all unfortunately now effective 
operatives...terrorist acts ... in modern times are often carried out by amateurs... (R v Benbrika & Ors [67]). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The fact that the Benbrika men and Elomar conspirators are Muslim, alone with the just about all of those convicted 
as terrorists in Australia might suggest Muslims are a threat to the Australian community. This is not supported by 
Australian Government statistics that indicate that less than two percent of the Australian population is Muslim. But 
more importantly, they have widespread origins coming from Turkey, Lebanon, Bosnia,   Kosovo, Herzegovina, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Indonesia, Somalia and the Sudan for a start. Historically, not all these 
populations have friendly histories. Furthermore, with Christians, not all Muslims practice their faith.  
 
If lack of successful terrorist attacks on Australian soil is used as a guide than counter-terrorism legislation and 
policy have been successful. However, the problems in the Haneef and ul-Haque matters combined with the overt 
radicalisation of those involved in the Benbrika and Elomar matters suggest underlying problems with our legislation 
and policy. For example, the different mandates applying to statutory authorities involved in counter-terrorism 
(Street Report).  
 
Because the background, community involvement and motives of home-grown terrorists who have been convicted 
are difficult to detect beyond possible religious fervour, a concerted policy of counter-terrorism counter-
radicalisation is needed if the potential risk to the Australian community is going to be effectively reduced. 
Legislation is not a shield and policy makers need to accept its use as a blunt weapon of deterrent and punishment is 
more akin to the underlying attitudes of terrorists rather those traditionally associated with a democratic state. What 
is needed is targeted education and counter-radicalisation policies that can provide an in-built resilience akin to a 
shield against potential home-grown terrorist attacks.  
 
 
Notes 
                                                          
i For example, following the events of 11 September 2001, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 
1373 that included: ‘all States shall…prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts … providing any form of 
support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts… Ensure that any person who participates 
in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to 
justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious 
criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such 
terrorist acts. ’ Retrieved October 7, 2010 from 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement   
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ii For example: International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 December 1999, UN Doc.A/Res/54/109 (1999), in 
force 10 April 2002). 
iii For example: Australia has signed an international treaty with Europol to facilitate transnational sharing of 
intelligence and access to crime-specific training and expertise. Europol is the European Union Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Agency which aims to improve the effectiveness and co–operation of the competent authorities in the 
Member States in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of 
organised crime. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-
liaison/europol.aspx  
iv For example: National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements and National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Retrieved 
October 7, 2010 from 
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NAtionalSecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doingNational_C
ounter-Terrorism_Arrangements  
v For example in 2002: Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombing) Act 2002, Border Security 
legislation Amendment Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002. Retrieved 
October 7, 2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/legis/cth  
vi Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia/Protecting Our Community, 
Commonwealth of Australia 2010. 
vii s.100 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
viiiss.102.1, 102.1(2) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
ix Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html   
x See, for example: DPP v Stonehouse [1977] 2 All ER 909 especially Lord Diplock at 916, 919, 920; Lord Solmon 
at 927  and Lord Edmund-Davis at 934 ; Alister v Regina (1984) 154 CLR 404 and Knight v Regina (1992) 175 CLR 
495. 
xi See, for example; s. 201A of Schedule 2 Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) requiring assisting authorities to access 
computer systems. 
xii See, for example; Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 (Cth) and Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) 
xiii See, for example; s. 34F(8) Australian Security Intelligence Act 1979 (Cth) which provides for incommunicado 
detention without notice; and s.104.5(3) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) concerned with interim control orders which 
can impose restrictions on communicating or associating with specified individuals; s105.41 Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth) concerned with disclosure offences and s.34ZS Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) 
Secrecy relating to warrants and questioning.   
xiv Retrieved October 7, 2010 from http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Media/Releases/20071012-Haneef.pdf  
xv Retrieved October 7, 2010 from Http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Director/Speeches/20091112cc-Prosecution-
Independence (7/10/2010). The policy can be read in full. Retrieved October 7, 2010 from 
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy  
xvi See also: Justice Adams in R v ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC 1251 and Ian Carnell, Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security, Report of Inquiry Into the Actions Taken by ASIO in 2003 in Respect of Mr Izhar ul-Haque and 
Related Matters (12 November 2008). Retrieved October 13, 2010 from http://www.igis.gov.au/statements.cfm  
xvii Haddara argued no evidence he ever read these materials: (R v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No 28) [2008] VSC 336 
(16 June 2008) at [42]. 
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